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Abstract 
The present study addressed the hypothesis that emotional stimuli relevant to survival or 
reproduction (biologically emotional stimuli) automatically affect cognitive processing (e.g., 
attention; memory), while those relevant to social life (socially emotional stimuli) require 
elaborative processing to modulate attention and memory. Results of our behavioral studies 
showed that: a) biologically emotional images hold attention more strongly than socially 
emotional images, b) memory for biologically emotional images was enhanced even with limited 
cognitive resources, but c) memory for socially emotional images was enhanced only when 
people had sufficient cognitive resources at encoding. Neither images’ subjective arousal nor 
their valence modulated these patterns. A subsequent functional magnetic resonance imaging 
study revealed that biologically emotional images induced stronger activity in visual cortex and 
greater functional connectivity between amygdala and visual cortex than did socially emotional 
images. These results suggest that the interconnection between the amygdala and visual cortex 
supports enhanced attention allocation to biological stimuli. In contrast, socially emotional 
images evoked greater activity in medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and yielded stronger 
functional connectivity between amygdala and MPFC than biological images.  Thus, it appears 
that emotional processing of social stimuli involves elaborative processing requiring frontal lobe 
activity.  
Keywords: social emotion, biological emotion, attention, memory encoding, amygdala, 
medial prefrontal cortex, fMRI 
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Emotion has a major impact on cognitive processing (see Dolan, 2002 for a review). To 
understand these effects, researchers have focused on two orthogonal dimensions of emotion 
(Anderson, Christoff, Stappen, et al., 2003; Russell & Carroll, 1999): arousal (how exciting or 
calming) and valence (how positive and negative). Studies based on this two-dimensional 
approach demonstrate the importance of both arousal and valence.  
In terms of valence, positive and negative emotions differ in how they affect various kinds 
of cognitive processing: memory encoding (Kensinger, 2009; Mather & Carstensen, 2005; 
Mickley & Kensinger, 2008; Ochsner, 2000; Talmi, Schimmack, Paterson, & Moscovitch, 2007), 
the scope of attention (Fenske & Eastwood, 2003; Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005; Rowe, Hirsh, 
& Anderson, 2007), cognitive flexibility (Isen & Daubman, 1984; Isen, Johnson, Mertz, & 
Robinson, 1985), creative problem solving (Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987; Subramaniam, 
Kounios, Parrish, & Jung-Beeman, 2009), cognitive control (Dreisbach, 2006), knowledge 
retrieval (Bäum & Kuhbandner, 2007), and perceptual processing (Kuhbandner, et al., 2009).  
Arousal also has effects on memory and other aspects of cognitive processing. People have 
enhanced memory for emotionally arousing materials (Bradley, Greenwald, Petry, & Lang, 1992; 
Dolcos & Denkova, 2008; Dolcos, LaBar, & Cabeza, 2004; Hamann, Ely, Grafton, & Kilts, 
1999; Kensinger & Corkin, 2004) and their intrinsic features (D'Argembeau & Van der Linden, 
2004; Doerksen & Shimamura, 2001; Kensinger & Corkin, 2003a; Mather, 2007; Mather & 
Nesmith, 2008; Nashiro & Mather, in press), but arousal either does not enhance or impair 
memory information peripheral to the emotional aspect of an event (Kensinger, 2009; Kensinger, 
Garoff-Eaton, & Schacter, 2007; Mather, Gorlick, & Nesmith, 2009; Payne, Stickgold, Swanberg, 
& Kensinger, 2008). Highly arousing stimuli also recruit attention (Anderson, 2005; Schimmack, 
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2005), which interrupts cognitive processing of competing less-salient stimuli (Arnell, Killman, 
& Fijavz, 2007; Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006; Ihssen, Heim, & Keil, 2007; Ihssen & Keil, 2009; 
Keil & Ihssen, 2004; Mather, et al., 2006; K. J. Mitchell, Mather, Johnson, Raye, & Greene, 
2006; Most, Chun, Widders, & Zald, 2005). In general, emotional arousal modulates cognitive 
processing, enhancing processing of salient stimuli while reducing processing of non-salient 
stimuli (Mather & Sutherland, 2011; Sutherland & Mather, under review).  
Although this two-dimensional approach can account for many effects, arousal and 
valence may not be sufficient to explain all of the effects of emotion on cognition. One possibly 
important factor which past studies have not addressed well is the motivational relevance (see 
Larson & Steuer, 2009 for related arguments). Emotional reactions are often induced by stimuli 
related to primary motives, such as survival (e.g., foods; Lang, et al., 1998; Morris & Dolan, 
2001) and reproduction (e.g., sexual images; Hamann, Herman, Nolan, & Wallen, 2004). 
However, people can also feel emotions when they encounter social stimuli that are not directly 
related to survival or reproduction (e.g., Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003; Singer, et al., 
2004). These two kinds of emotional stimuli might influence cognitive processing in different 
ways.  
For example, many studies on the effects of emotion on cognition have used picture 
stimuli obtained from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS: Lang, Bradley, & 
Cuthbert, 1997). The IAPS involves arousing pictures depicting sexual behaviors, severe injuries, 
dead bodies, or aimed guns. These stimuli are highly related to survival or reproduction, 
representing situations that imply direct physical outcomes (either positive or negative), such as 
death, injuries, and sexual experiences. In contrast, other pictures in the IAPS are less relevant to 
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survival or reproduction and are more relevant to social life (e.g., smiling children, crying 
people). These stimuli represent social situations with other individuals, each of whom could 
have a different intention, goal, or emotional feeling, depending on the contexts and other 
individuals. Because of the complex nature of social situations, the meanings, outcomes and 
causes of emotion are embedded in each stimulus context.  
These considerations suggest the following hypothesis: Emotional materials related to 
survival/reproduction (biologically emotional materials) imply clear meanings and direct 
physical outcomes, and therefore, their emotional nature can be detected even with just 
automatic processing (see Figure 1A). In contrast, emotional materials less related to survival or 
reproduction and more strongly related to social life (socially emotional materials) have 
ambiguous meanings and outcomes shaped by their context. Therefore, they need to be 
interpreted by each individual in each context in order to elicit an emotion. Thus, socially 
emotional materials should require effortful cognitive processing to elicit emotions and any 
subsequent effects of emotion on cognition (see Figure 1B). The present study aims to address 
this hypothesis.  
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Biologically emotional stimuli
(survival- or reproduction-
related stimuli)
(A)
Socially emotional stimuli
(stimuli relevant to
social life)
(B)
Elaborative Processing
Emotional reaction
Cognitive processing
(e.g., attention, memory)
Automatic processing
Emotional reaction
Cognitive processing
(e.g., attention, memory)
 
 
Effects of Survival or Reproduction Relevance 
Consistent with the hypothesis, past studies reported preferential processing of 
survival-relevant stimuli. People tend to detect threats to survival (such as a gun or snake) more 
Figure 1. Proposed mechanisms by which biologically and socially emotional stimuli 
modulate cognitive processing. (A) Biologically emotional stimuli imply clear/direct 
physical outcomes. Therefore, their emotional nature can be detected even with just 
automatic processing, and they can modulate cognitive processing without elaborative 
processing. (B) In contrast, socially emotional stimuli have ambiguous meanings and 
outcomes. Thus, each social stimulus has to be interpreted by each individual in each 
context in order to elicit an emotion and to modulate cognitive processing.   
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automatically than other neutral stimuli (e.g., Blanchette, 2006; Brosch & Sharma, 2005; Carlson, 
Fee, & Reinke, 2009; Fox, Griggs, & Mouchlianitis, 2007; Öhman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001). 
Similar tendencies were reported in preschool children (LoBue & DeLoache, 2008) and infants 
from 5 to 18 month olds (DeLoache & LoBue, 2009; LoBue & DeLoache, 2008, 2010; Rakison 
& Derringer, 2008), suggesting the possibility that humans have an innate predisposition to 
process survival-related stimuli preferentially. 
Although past research has mostly focused on the effects of threatening stimuli, recent 
research demonstrated that the effects of survival relevance are not limited to negative stimuli. 
Positive stimuli related to reproduction, such as sexual materials (Lykins, Meana, & Kambe, 
2006) and babies’ faces (Brosch, Sander, Pourtois, & Scherer, 2008; Brosch, Sander, & Scherer, 
2007), captured people’s attention automatically. Likewise, infants’ faces more quickly induced 
strong activity in reward-related regions in the brain than did adults’ faces (Kringelbach, et al., 
2008; Nitschke, et al., 2004). There is also evidence that basic motives, such as hunger or thirst, 
produce preferential processing of positive reinforcers that satisfy those needs (Drobes, et al., 
2001; Mogg, Bradley, Hyare, & Lee, 1998; Morris & Dolan, 2001). Furthermore, studies have 
demonstrated preferential attention and memory encoding for taboo words compared to other 
emotional words (Anderson, 2005; Jay, Caldwell-Harris, & King, 2008; Kensinger & Corkin, 
2003b; MacKay, et al., 2004; Mathewson, Arnell, & Mansfield, 2008). Although taboo words are 
defined by social norms, many of them refer to sexual acts or body products (Foote & Woodward, 
1973; Jay, 2009). Thus, it appears that people can process survival/reproduction-related stimuli 
preferentially even after they are converted to an abstract/verbal format. 
In summary, past studies suggest that materials related to survival or reproduction receive 
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preferential processing. Most of these studies, however, did not compare survival relevance with 
social life relevance. Thus, it is unclear whether survival relevance impacts cognitive processing 
more automatically than social relevance. 
Social Cognitive Neuroscience Studies on Biological vs. Social Emotions 
Recent studies in social cognitive neuroscience have started to examine how biological and 
social emotions are processed in the brain (Eisenberger & Lieberman, 2004; Eisenberger, et al., 
2003; Immordino-Yang, McColl, Damasio, & Damasio, 2009; Jackson, Meltzoff, & Decety, 
2005; Moll, de Oliveira-Souza, Bramati, & Grafman, 2002; Moll, de Oliveira-Souza, Eslinger, et 
al., 2002; Moll, Eslinger, & Oliveira-Souza, 2001; Singer, et al., 2004). Although each study 
dealt with a different aspect of social emotion, such as social pain, moral judgments, empathy, or 
compassion, they each suggested differences in underlying processing between biologically and 
socially emotional stimuli.  
For example, observing others’ physical pain induced earlier activity in emotion-related 
regions in the brain than did observing others’ social pain (Immordino-Yang, et al., 2009). 
Studies also revealed that biologically emotional images (e.g., sexual images or mutilation) 
modulate activity in visual cortex (Bradley, et al., 2003), skin conductance response, and startle 
reflex (Bradley, Codispoti, Cuthbert, & Lang, 2001) more strongly than do socially emotional 
images (e.g., happy families). In addition, processing of biologically emotional films (i.e., a 
pizza commercial; wounded bodies) produced greater activity in brain regions involved in 
visceral responses (Britton, et al., 2006), while processing of socially emotional stimuli (e.g., 
comedy show; poignant bereavement scene; pictures involving people or faces) has been 
associated with cortical regions that implement higher order cognitive processing (Britton, et al., 
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2006; Norris, Chen, Zhu, Small, & Cacioppo, 2004). These results seem consistent with our 
hypothesis, suggesting that people process the emotional implications of biologically emotional 
stimuli automatically, but engage in more elaborative processing when presented with socially 
emotional stimuli.  
Since these studies targeted physical or neural responses induced by biological and social 
emotional stimuli, however, it is not clear whether relevance to survival or reproduction versus 
relevance to social life affect cognitive processing (e.g., attention or memory encoding) 
differently. In addition, there has been no clear agreement about how to define biologically and 
socially emotional stimuli, leading different studies to use different ways to categorize 
biologically and socially emotional stimuli. Furthermore, most of the past studies did not match 
arousal and valence between social vs. biological emotional materials. Thus, it is unclear whether 
the results were due to the social/biological nature of stimuli or arousal/valence.  
Overview of the Present Study 
We tested our hypothesis that, compared with socially emotional stimuli, biologically 
emotional materials impact cognitive processing more automatically using several different 
paradigms. In Study 1, we compared the effects of biological versus social emotional materials 
on attention and memory encoding. In Study 2, we further examined memory encoding of 
biological and social emotional materials, manipulating cognitive resources available at encoding 
to see if cognitive resources affect memory encoding of biologically and socially emotional 
materials differently. Finally, in Study 3 we investigated the brain regions associated with 
processing biological and social emotional stimuli by using functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI).  
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Given the absence of clear definitions about biological and social emotional materials in 
the literature, across all studies, we adopted a bottom-up approach to define biologically and 
socially emotional stimuli to reduce any arbitrary biases introduced by the researchers. That is, 
we selected stimuli based on people’s ratings on relevance to survival/reproduction and relevance 
to social life. Although there might be emotional stimuli rated high in relation to 
survival/reproduction and to social adaptation, the primary purpose of the current study is to 
identify the effects of biological and social relevance separately. Therefore, as biologically 
emotional stimuli, we used stimuli rated high in relation to survival/reproduction and low in 
relation to social life. Socially emotional stimuli were also defined as those rated high in relation 
to social life but low in relation to survival/reproduction. We also carefully matched arousal and 
valence across the biologically and the socially emotional stimuli to avoid confounding the 
stimulus type (i.e., biological or social stimuli) and arousal or valence. 
Study 1 
In Study 1, we examined the effects of biologically/socially emotional stimuli on attention. 
Previous studies revealed that emotional stimuli have more impact on attention disengagement 
than on attention capture (Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001; Fox, Russo, & Dutton, 2002) 
especially when they compete with other stimuli for attention (Anderson, 2005; Buodo, Sarlo, & 
Palomba, 2002; Pratto & John, 1991; Schimmack, 2005). Based on these findings, we 
investigated the effects of biologically and socially emotional stimuli on attention disengagement, 
by using a dot-probe task combined with other competing stimuli. To enhance participants’ 
engagement, a problem solving task was employed as a competing task (see Schimmack, 2005 
for a similar procedure).  
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On each trial (Figure 2A), participants were shown a riddle, which was followed by either 
a biological, social, neutral picture, or asterisks at the center of a display. After 150 ms of the 
picture or the asterisks, participants saw a dot-probe at one of eight possible locations (Figure 
2B), all of which were different from the picture’s location. The participants’ task was to indicate 
the location of the dot-probe as quickly and as accurately as possible. If participants have more 
difficulty disengaging their attention from biologically emotional pictures than from socially 
emotional ones, their reaction times to detect the dot-probe should be slower after biological 
pictures than social ones. Study 1 also included a surprise memory test of pictures to examine the 
effects of biologically/socially emotional stimuli on memory as well as attention.  
Method 
Participants. Twenty-two Japanese undergraduate and graduate students at the University 
of Tokyo took part in the experiment (14 males; Mage = 21.09, SD = 2.36).  
Materials: Pictures. Based on pilot ratings (see Supplementary Materials), we selected 10 
biological (5 positive, 5 negative), 10 social (5 positive, 5 negative), and 10 neutral pictures. 
Biological and social pictures were matched in arousal and valence (see S-Table 1). Examples for 
each category were sexual images or appetizing food for biological positive pictures; a snake, 
skull, or a man who commits suicide for biological negative ones; smiling people, celebrating 
athletes, or money for social positive ones; KKK or neo-Nazi for social negative ones. The 
recognition test included an additional 5 biological positive, 5 biological negative, 5 social 
positive, 5 social negative, and 10 neutral pictures as foils. 
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RIGHT 
KEY
MIDDLE 
KEY 
What is so fragile that when
you say its name you break it?
LEFT 
KEY 
Silence
(B)
(A)
 
 
Figure 2. (A) A schematic representation of procedures in Study 1. On each trial, 
participants viewed a riddle and then saw a picture (in the biological, social, and 
neutral conditions) or asterisks (in the control condition). After 150 ms of the picture or 
the asterisks (150 ms), the red dot appeared at one of eight possible locations.  
Participants were asked to indicate the location of the dot as quickly and as accurately 
as possible. Immediately after they answered the correct location of the dot, the dot 
was replaced by the solution to the riddle. (B) Eight possible locations for the dot probe 
and the correct key response for each of them.   
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Procedure. We employed a modified version of the dot-probe task to examine the effects 
of biological and social emotional stimuli on attention (Figure 2; see Supplementary Methods for 
details). After participants finished the attention task, they worked on a mathematical calculation 
task for 5 min, which was followed by a surprise recognition test for the pictures. In the memory 
test, participants were shown pictures used in the attention task and new pictures and asked to 
indicate whether they saw each picture or not. 
Results 
Effects of pictures on reaction time to detect the dot-probe. In this and the following 
studies in the current article, outlier response times were identified using Tukey (1977)’s 
criterion of three times the interquartile range (the hinge-spread) higher than the third quartile in 
each condition. The remaining reaction times were submitted to a one-way analyses of variance 
(ANOVA).
1
 This ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of stimulus type, F(3, 63) = 7.74, R
2
 
= .01, p < .01. Post-hoc comparisons (Tukey’s HSD) revealed that reaction times were 
significantly longer after biological pictures than after social pictures, neutral pictures, or 
asterisks (Figure 3A), respective ts(63) = 2.78, 3.30, 4.44, SEs = 10, ps < .05. In contrast, the 
reaction time did not differ across social, neutral, and control conditions (ps > .30). In addition, 
the difference between biological and social pictures was not modulated by valence and arousal 
(Figure 3B; see Supplementary Results for details). These results suggest that people have more 
                                                 
1
 Because participants pressed the left key more quickly than the other two keys (ps < .01), 
response key (left, middle, right) was used as a covariate. The response key did not modulate the 
effects of the stimulus type (p > .80).  
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difficulty disengaging their attention from biologically emotional pictures than from socially 
emotional pictures, regardless of valence and subjective arousal.  
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Figure 3.  Effects of stimulus type (biologically vs. socially emotional stimuli) on 
attention in Study 1. Error bars represent standard errors. (A) Reaction times to detect 
the dot-probe were slower after biologically emotional pictures than other conditions, 
while the reaction times did not differ across social, neutral and control conditions. (B) 
The valence category and subjective arousal did not modulate the results in reaction 
times. 
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Memory of pictures. Next, we examined participants’ memory for biologically versus 
socially emotional pictures. A one-way repeated measures ANOVA on the hit rates of pictures 
revealed a significant effect of picture type, F(2, 42) = 8.77, R
2
 = .19, p < .01. Post-hoc Tukey’s 
HSD tests revealed that participants remembered biological (M = .33) and social pictures (M 
= .39) significantly better than neutral ones (M = .19), respective ts(42) = 3.13, 4.15, SEs = .05, 
ps < .05. There was no significant difference for biological and social pictures (p > .40). Further 
analyses revealed no significant effects of valence and arousal (see Supplementary Results).
2
   
Discussion 
Study 1 revealed that biologically emotional stimuli hold attention more than do socially 
emotional stimuli, regardless of valence and arousal. Like the biologically emotional pictures, 
socially emotional pictures had higher arousal than neutral pictures—yet the social pictures did 
not slow reaction times more than neutral pictures did. Thus, the relevance to survival or 
reproduction had a larger impact on attention than arousal or valence. In contrast, participants 
remembered both biologically and socially emotional stimuli significantly better than neutral 
                                                 
2
 The false alarm rate (M = .06) was not significantly different across stimulus type (p 
> .40). In addition, a similar analysis on the corrected recognition measure (i.e., hit rate minus 
false alarm rate) confirmed a significant effect of stimulus type, F(2, 42) = 8.83, R
2
 = .17, p < .01, 
as participants had better memory for biological (M = .27) and social (M = .34) stimuli than 
neutral stimuli (M = .10), ts(42) = 2.95, 4.20, ps < .05. The difference between biological and 
social stimuli was not significant (p > .25). Thus, hit rate and corrected recognition measures 
yielded the same pattern of results.  
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stimuli. In fact, they remembered socially emotional stimuli as well as biologically emotional 
stimuli. These results suggest that memory for socially emotional stimuli and memory for 
biologically emotional stimuli are facilitated through different mechanisms. Study 2 addresses 
this possibility.  
One possible concern about Study 1 is that each person might have different evaluations 
about what is related to social adaptation and what is related to survival/reproduction, depending 
on his/her experiences. In addition, Study 1 might not have enough statistical power to detect the 
effects of arousal and valence, because of the relatively small number of trials in each condition. 
The statistical power issue was exacerbated by the fact that dichotomization of continuous 
variables (i.e., arousal and valence in this case) results in the loss of the statistical power (Irwin 
& McClelland, 2003). However, in a supplemental study (S-Study 1; see Supplementary Studies 
for details), we replicated the results from Study 1 while determining each picture’s 
biological/social relevance, arousal, and valence by each participant’s evaluation. In this 
supplemental study, we treated arousal and valence as continuous variables to increase the 
statistical power; as in Study 1 we found a significant effect of biological relevance but not of 
valence and arousal (S-Figure 1). Thus, this supplemental study provides additional support for 
the importance of biological relevance in attention.  
Study 2 
Past research suggests two different mechanisms by which emotion enhances memory 
(Anderson, Christoff, Panitz, De Rosa, & Gabrieli, 2003; Kensinger & Corkin, 2004; Talmi, et al., 
2007); a) emotional materials tend to attract and hold attention more automatically than do 
neutral materials, and b) emotional materials recruit more effortful semantic elaboration than 
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neutral materials. In Study 1, we found that biologically emotional stimuli held attention more 
strongly than socially emotional ones when the pictures were not relevant to the primary task. 
This automatic capture of attention by biologically emotional stimuli but not socially emotional 
stimuli suggests that memory for biologically emotional stimuli would depend on the automatic 
attention mechanism more than would socially emotional stimuli. In contrast, if each socially 
emotional stimulus has to be interpreted by each individual in each context to elicit an emotion 
(as we posited above), the semantic elaborative process should be more crucial in memory for 
socially emotional stimuli than for biological stimuli. Study 2 addressed these predictions. 
Half of the participants in Study 2 viewed emotional or neutral pictures while working on a 
secondary task (divided-attention condition), whereas the other half viewed pictures without any 
additional task (full-attention condition). This encoding session was followed by a surprise 
recognition test of picture memory. To examine how vividly participants remembered each 
picture, we included remember-know judgments (Gardiner, Ramponi, & Richardson-Klavehn, 
1998) as well as old-new judgments. If memory encoding of socially emotional materials 
depends on effortful elaborative processing, participants should show worse memory for social 
stimuli in the divided-attention condition than in the full-attention condition. In contrast, if 
memory for biologically emotional materials is enhanced through automatic attention 
mechanisms, participants’ memory for biologically emotional pictures should be less influenced 
by the attention manipulations than their memory for socially emotional stimuli.  
Method 
Participants. Forty-eight Japanese undergraduates and graduate students at University of 
Tokyo participated (21 males; Mage = 22.19, SD = 2.03). They were randomly assigned to either 
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full- (N = 25) or divided-attention condition (N = 23). Data from two participants were not used; 
one did not understand the differences between remember/know and old/new judgments in the 
recognition test, and the other did not press keys during the encoding session.  
Materials. Based on the pilot picture rating study, we chose 32 biological (16 positive, 16 
negative), 32 social (16 positive, 16 negative), and 32 neutral pictures. Biologically and socially 
emotional pictures were selected to have matched valence and arousal levels (see S-Table 1). In 
the recognition task, 78 non-studied foils (13 biological positive, 13 biological negative, 13 
social positive, 13 social negative, and 26 neutral) were used. 
Procedure. Participants saw each of 96 pictures for 2500 ms in a randomized order with a 
4-sec inter-trial interval. The encoding session consisted of four blocks. Both in the full- and 
divided-attention conditions, participants were asked to make a judgment about whether they 
liked or disliked each picture as quickly and as accurately as possible, using their right hand to 
press keys.  
In addition to this picture judgment task, participants in the divided attention condition 
listened to a sound sequence, and worked on a sound-pitch judgment task (Gilbert & Silvera, 
1996) throughout the session. The sound sequence consisted of a low-pitched, a medium-pitched, 
and a high-pitched tone in randomized order with variable intervals (approx 1 – 3 secs). 
Participants’ task was to keep track of the sound sequence and to press a button with their left 
hand immediately after they detected a specific sequence of three tones: low, medium, and high 
pitched tones in that order regardless of interval duration.  
The encoding session was followed by a mathematical calculation task for three minutes. 
Finally, participants were given a surprise recognition test for the pictures. They indicated 
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whether they remembered seeing the picture (i.e., old) or not (i.e., new). For any item that 
received an “old” decision, participants were asked to indicate whether they vividly remembered 
seeing the picture in the first session (i.e., remember) or sensed that the picture was familiar but 
did not remember any details about its prior presentation (i.e., know).  
Results 
Effects of attention and stimulus type on memory. A 2 (attention: full vs. divided) X 3 
(stimulus type: biological, social vs. neutral) ANOVA on the hit rate
3
 revealed significant effects 
of attention, F(1, 44) = 9.66, p < .01, R
2
 = .18, stimulus type, F(2, 88) = 5.53, p < .01, R
2
 = .33, 
and an interaction between attention and stimulus type, F(2, 88) = 3.36, p < .05, R
2
 = .17. The 
attention manipulation had a significant effect for social, F(1, 88) = 16.08, p < .01, and neutral 
stimuli, F(1, 88) = 4.31, p < .05, but not for biological stimuli (p > .10; Figure 4A). Participants 
in the full-attention condition remembered biological and social stimuli significantly better than 
neutral stimuli, ts(44) = 3.16, 3.94, SEs = .02, ps < .01, with no significant difference between 
biological and social stimuli (p > .60; Tukey’s HSD). In contrast, participants in the 
divided-attention condition remembered biological stimuli better than social, t(44) = 2.39, SE 
= .04, p < .05, and neutral stimuli, t(44) = 2.21, SE = .04, p < .05, and there was no significant 
difference between social and neutral stimuli (p > .95).
4
 These results suggest that cognitive 
                                                 
3
 Because participants reported better memories for pictures in the last two blocks than in 
the first two blocks (ps < .01), we added block order as a covariate. There were no significant 
interactions between block order and stimulus type. 
4
 A similar analysis on the false alarm rates did not find a significant interaction between 
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resources contribute more to encoding socially emotional materials than to encoding biologically 
emotional materials.  
Effects of attention and stimulus type on Remember rates. A similar analysis on the 
proportion of “Remember” responses also revealed significant effects of attention, F(1, 44) = 
5.75, p < .05, R
2
 = .10, of stimulus type, F(2, 88) = 8.28, p < .01, R
2
 = .22, and an interaction 
between them, F(2, 88) = 5.27, p < .01, R
2
 = .10. The attention manipulation had a significant 
effect on memory for social and neutral stimuli, Fs(1, 88) =11.35, 4.33, ps < .05, but not for 
biological stimuli (p > .30; Figure 5A). Participants in the full-attention condition were more 
likely to vividly remember social stimuli than biological or neutral stimuli, ts(44) = 3.35, 4.53, 
SEs = .02, .03, ps < .01, while there was no significant difference between biological and neutral 
stimuli (p > .20; Tukey’s HSD). When participants’ attention was focused elsewhere in the 
divided-attention condition, however, they did not show enhanced remember rates for social 
stimuli compared with neutral or biological stimuli (ps > .20). Instead, they produced a greater 
proportion of remember responses to biological stimuli than to neutral stimuli, t(44) = 3.16, SE 
= .03, p < .05. Thus, it appears that vivid memory for socially emotional stimuli depends more on 
                                                                                                                                                             
stimulus type and attention (p > .45). The accuracy measure of recognition (i.e., hit-false alarm 
rates) also produced similar patterns to the hit rates; participants’ memory was significantly 
impaired in the divided-attention condition compared with the full-attention condition for 
socially emotional stimuli, F(1, 88) = 17.37, p < .01, but not for biologically emotional stimuli (p 
> .05).  
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cognitive resources than does vivid memory for biologically emotional stimuli.
5
 
Like/Dislike Judgments in the Encoding Session. To examine whether the attention 
manipulation influenced like/dislike judgments during the encoding session, the reaction times of 
like/dislike judgment were submitted to a 3 (stimulus type) X 2 (attention) ANOVA. This 
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of stimulus type, F(2, 88) = 26.24, p < .01, R
2
 = .02, 
with no other significant effects (ps > .30). Participants took longer to make judgments about 
neutral pictures (M = 1178 ms) than social (M = 1092 ms) and biological pictures (M = 1048 ms; 
Tukey’s HSD), ts(88) = 4.12, 7.12, SEs = 18, ps < .01. This result is not surprising because we 
did not allow participants to judge pictures as neutral in their like/dislike judgments. More 
interestingly, participants took longer to make a decision about social pictures than biological 
pictures (Msocial = 1092 ms vs. Mbio = 1048 ms), t(88) = 2.40, SE = 18, p < .05, suggesting that 
socially emotional stimuli require deeper cognitive processing to make like/dislike judgments 
than do biologically emotional stimuli.  
                                                 
5
 The remember rates to new items did not show a significant interaction between 
stimulus type and attention (p > .70). The corrected “Remember” rates (i.e., remember rates to 
old items minus remember rates to new items) also produced similar patterns; vivid memory for 
socially emotional pictures was impaired in the divided-attention condition compared with the 
full-attention condition, F(1, 88) = 10.84, p < .01, while there were no significant differences 
between divided- and full- attention conditions in memory of biologically emotional pictures (p 
> .05). A 2 (attention) X 3 (stimulus type) ANOVA on the proportion of “Know” responses did 
not reveal a significant interaction between attention and stimulus type (p > .30).  
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We also calculated the proportion of pictures for which the participant’s judgments were 
consistent with the valence categories (i.e., liked positive pictures and disliked negative pictures), 
to examine the accuracy of participants’ judgments. This consistency measure was submitted to a 
2 (attention) X 2 (stimulus type: social vs. biological) ANOVA. Because it is hard to define 
correct judgments for neutral pictures, we did not involve neutral pictures in this analysis. The 
ANOVA revealed a main effect of stimulus type, F(1, 44) = 4.20, p < .05, R
2
 = .06, indicating 
that participants were more accurate when they made judgments about biological pictures than 
social ones (M bio = .76 vs. M social = .72). None of the other effects were significant (ps > .20).  
Discussion 
When participants had enough attention (i.e., full attention condition), socially emotional 
stimuli were remembered as well as biologically emotional stimuli. In addition, when we looked 
at remember rates, socially emotional stimuli produced even higher remember rates than 
biological stimuli. However, dividing attention impaired memory for socially emotional stimuli 
more than for biologically emotional stimuli. As a result, in the divided attention condition, 
biologically emotional stimuli were more likely to be recognized than socially emotional stimuli. 
Further analyses confirmed similar patterns irrespective of valence and arousal (Figure 4B-4C; 
Figure 5B-5C; see Supplementary Results for details). These results suggest that memory for 
socially emotional stimuli is enhanced through effortful elaboration, while memory for 
biologically emotional stimuli is enhanced through automatic attention allocation, regardless of 
subjective arousal and valence.  
We also found that during the encoding session, participants took longer to make 
like/dislike judgments for socially emotional stimuli than for biological stimuli. This result is 
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also consistent with our hypothesis that the affective nature of biologically emotional stimuli can 
be detected more automatically than the affective nature of socially emotional stimuli.   
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Figure 4. Results of the hit rates from the picture memory test in Study 2. Error bars 
represent standard errors. (A)When people have enough cognitive resources at encoding, they 
remembered both biologically and socially emotional stimuli better than neutral stimuli. In contrast, 
when participants’ attention was focused elsewhere, it impaired their memory for social stimuli, but 
not for biological stimuli. (B) Valence and (C) subjective arousal did not modulate the patterns.   
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Figure 5. Results of the Remember rates from the picture memory test in Study 2. Error bars 
represent standard errors. (A) Attentional resources influenced encoding detailed memories for 
socially emotional stimuli more than for biologically emotional stimuli; although social stimuli 
produced higher remember rates than biological stimuli in the full attention condition, dividing 
attention impaired memory for socially emotional stimuli, but not for biologically emotional stimuli. 
Similar results were obtained regardless of (B) valence and (C) subjective arousal.    
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Study 3 
Study 3 examined the neural mechanisms underlying processing of biologically and 
socially emotional stimuli. Given previous evidence showing that the amygdala responds to both 
social and non-social emotional stimuli (e.g., Adolphs, 2003; Britton, et al., 2006; Moll, de 
Oliveira-Souza, Eslinger, et al., 2002; Norris, et al., 2004), we expected that both biologically 
and socially emotional stimuli would induce similar activity in the amygdala. According to the 
results from Studies 1-2 and our hypothesis as outlined in Figure 1, however, we also expected 
different brain regions activated and different functional connectivity with the amygdala 
depending on stimulus type (i.e., biologically and socially emotional stimuli).  
Past studies revealed that the amygdala is reciprocally interconnected with the visual 
cortex (Amaral, Behniea, & Kelly, 2003; Emery & Amaral, 2000), and that these two brain 
regions influence each other, which results in enhanced perceptual processing of emotional 
stimuli (Bradley, et al., 2003; Schupp, Junghöfer, Weike, & Hamm, 2003). If biologically 
emotional images hold visual attention more strongly than socially emotional images as revealed 
in Study 1, biologically emotional pictures should produce greater activity in visual cortex and 
stronger connectivity between the amygdala and visual cortex than do socially emotional 
pictures.  
In contrast, previous research has suggested that medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) 
implements meta-cognitive or elaborative operations about emotional aspects of stimuli (Amodio 
& Frith, 2006; Cunningham, Johnson, Gatenby, Gore, & Banaji, 2003; Ochsner, Knierim, et al., 
2004). If socially emotional stimuli trigger more elaborative processing than biologically 
emotional stimuli, MPFC should show stronger activation in response to socially emotional 
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stimuli than to biologically emotional stimuli. In addition, if MPFC plays a critical role in 
processing the affective nature of social stimuli, the amygdala should have stronger functional 
connectivity with MPFC for socially emotional stimuli than for biological stimuli.  
Study 3 also employed both pictorial stimuli and verbal stimuli to examine whether 
biologically and socially emotional stimuli recruit similar brain regions regardless of the stimuli 
format (i.e., word or picture). Two different predictions can be made concerning the brain regions 
underlying processing of words. First, if the conceptual meaning of the stimuli is critical, 
biologically emotional stimuli would activate similar brain regions, regardless of the format of 
the materials. Similarly, socially emotional words and pictures would activate overlapping 
regions of the brain. An alternative possibility is that once biologically emotional stimuli become 
abstract (i.e., verbal stimuli in this case), physical outcomes would be less evident than in 
pictorial stimuli, and therefore, they might need similar elaborative processing as socially 
emotional stimuli to evoke emotional reactions. In contrast, socially emotional stimuli would not 
imply direct physical outcomes, regardless of the stimulus formats, and both socially emotional 
words and pictures would need similar elaborative processing. Thus, an alternative prediction is 
that biologically emotional words recruit different brain regions from biologically emotional 
pictures but induce similar activation patterns to socially emotional stimuli, while socially 
emotional stimuli activate similar brain regions, regardless of the stimulus format. By including 
biologically and socially emotional words, we addressed these predictions.  
Method 
Participants. Sixteen Japanese University of Tsukuba undergraduates and graduate 
students took part in the experiment (12 males; Mage = 21.2, SD = 1.78). They gave informed 
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consent in accordance with the MRI ethics committee of AIST. Prospective participants were 
excluded if they had any medical, neurological, or psychiatric illness. One participant judged 
more than 70% of social positive pictures and more than 60% of social negative pictures to be 
neutral during the task. Data from this participant were not included.  
Materials: Emotional pictures. Twenty-eight biologically emotional pictures (14 positive, 
14 negative), 28 socially emotional pictures (14 positive, 14 negative), and 28 neutral pictures 
were selected based on the pilot picture rating study. Social and biological pictures were matched 
not only in arousal and valence (see S-Table 1), but also in luminance (measured by Adobe 
Photoshop). Neutral pictures were also matched in luminance to the emotional pictures. We also 
included 14 scrambled images as nonsense stimuli. They were created based on three pictures 
from biological positive, biological negative, social positive, and social negative picture, and two 
neutral pictures used in the experiment.  
Materials: Emotional words. Based on a pilot rating study of words (see Supplementary 
Materials), 28 biological (14 positive, 14 negative), 28 social (14 positive, 14 negative), and 28 
neutral words were chosen (see S-Table 3). There were no differences in arousal or valence 
scores between the biological and social stimuli. In addition, 14 nonsense words were used in the 
experiment. Biological, social and neutral words were matched on familiarity obtained from 
published norms (Amano & Kondo, 2000).  
Behavioral procedure. In each trial, participants saw either a word or a picture for 1800 
ms. Words and pictures from the different emotion categories were randomly intermixed, with 
inter-stimulus intervals ranging from 6 to 8 secs. After each stimulus disappeared, participants 
were asked to indicate whether they liked, disliked, or were neutral about each stimulus by 
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pressing buttons (see Supplementary Results for behavioral results).  
Functional MRI data acquisition and preprocessing. All scanning was performed on a 
3.0-T MRI Scanner (GE 3T Signa) equipped with EPI capability using the standard head coil for 
radiofrequency transmission and signal reception. Twenty-seven axial slices (4 mm thick and 0.2 
mm gap, interleaved) were prescribed to cover the whole brain. A T2* weighted gradient echo 
EPI was employed. The imaging parameters were TR=2s, TE=30ms, FA=75, and FOV=20 
cm×20 cm (64×64 mesh). Each participant’s data were individually pre-processed by SPM8 
(Wellcome Trust Center for Neuroimaging). In the preprocessing analysis, images were corrected 
for slice-timing and motion, then spatially normalized into the Montreal Neurological Institute 
(MNI) template and spatially smoothed using a Gaussian kernel of 8mm FWHM.  
Whole-brain analysis. For each participant, stimulus-dependent changes in BOLD signal 
were modeled with regressors for each event type: neutral, biological positive, biological 
negative, social positive, social negative, and nonsense for each stimulus format (i.e., word and 
picture). The regressors were convolved with the canonical hemodynamic response function 
provided by SPM. A high-pass filter (cutoff period = 128 s) was applied to remove 
low-frequency artifacts from the data. Effects of each event type were estimated using a 
fixed-effects model and then entered into a random effects analysis. Because preliminary fMRI 
analyses found similar patterns between positive and negative stimuli (see S-Tables 4-6), we 
report our main results from analyses with positive and negative valence categories collapsed.  
In the whole-brain analysis, we performed two analyses. First, we assessed activity 
differences between biologically and socially emotional stimuli. The threshold was set at p < .05 
-FDR at the cluster level with a height threshold of t = 3.79. Second, to reveal brain regions 
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commonly activated by the two kinds of emotional stimuli, conjunction analyses were performed 
using the masking function in SPM. For this purpose, initial contrast analyses examined brain 
regions involved in processing each type of emotional stimuli compared with neutral and 
nonsense stimuli. These individual contrast analyses were then entered into conjunction analyses. 
The threshold for each contrast entered into a conjunction analysis was set at a voxel level p 
< .001 (uncorrected), which resulted in a conjoint probability of p < .00001. Clusters of 
activations that involved less than ten voxels were discarded. In both analyses, locations reported 
by SPM were converted into Talairach coordinates (Talairach & Tournoux, 1988) by the 
MNI-to-Talairach transformation algorithm (Lancaster, et al., 2007). The Talairach Daemon 
version 2.4.2 (Lancaster, et al., 2000) was then used to determine the nearest gray matter. 
Region-of-interest analyses. As discussed above, we expected that biological and social 
stimuli would both activate the amygdala. However, the full-attention condition results of Study 
2 suggest that there may be differences in hippocampal activity during viewing pictures, as 
participants remembered social stimuli more vividly than biological stimuli. To address these 
possibilities, we structurally defined bilateral amygdala, hippocampus, and parahippocampal 
gyrus, based on AAL atlas (Tzourio-Mazoyer, et al., 2002) and performed region-of-interest 
(ROI) analyses, using the MarsBar toolbox (Brett, Anton, Valabregue, & Poline, 2002).  
Functional connectivity analyses. To examine functional connectivity with the amygdala, 
we applied a beta series correlation analysis (Gazzaley, Cooney, Rissman, & D'Esposito, 2005; 
Rissman, Gazzaley, & D'Esposito, 2004). This allowed us to use trial-to-trial variability to 
characterize dynamic inter-regional interactions. As a first step, a new GLM design file was 
constructed where each individual trial for each condition was coded with a unique covariate, 
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resulting in 196 independent variables. To reduce the confounding effects of the global signal 
change, the global mean signal level over all brain voxels was calculated for each time point and 
was used as a covariate. Second, the least squares solution of the GLM yielded a beta value for 
each trial for each individual subject. These beta values were then sorted by stimulus type. As in 
the univariate analyses, we collapsed positive and negative stimuli in each stimulus type. As a 
third step, mean activity (i.e., mean parameter estimates) was extracted for each individual trial 
from a seed region identified in the whole-brain analysis. For each stimulus type, we then 
computed correlations between the seed’s beta series and the beta series of all other voxels in the 
brain, thus generating condition-specific seed correlation maps. Correlation magnitudes were 
converted into z-scores using the Fisher’s r-to-z transformation. Finally, condition-dependent 
changes in functional connectivity were assessed using random-effects analyses, which were 
thresholded at p < .005-uncorrected at voxel-level combined with a cluster extent threshold of 20 
contiguous voxels. 
Results and Discussion 
Below, we describe results for emotional pictures first, followed by results for emotional 
words. 
Brain areas shared by biological and social emotional pictures. A conjunction analysis 
between biological and social pictures revealed that both biological and social pictures induced 
activity in the left amygdala and the left MPFC (Table 1, Figure 6A and 6B). These results 
suggest that biologically and socially emotional images share some neural mechanisms. 
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Figure 6. Brain areas in which activity was associated with both biological and social 
pictures in Study 3: (A) left amygdala (Y = -5) and (B) left MPFC (x = -11).  ROI 
analyses also revealed that both biologically and socially emotional pictures produced 
similar activity in (C) left and (D) right amygdala. 
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Table 1. Regions activated by both biologically and socially emotional pictures as 
revealed by a conjunction analysis. 
MNI Talairach
Area H BA x y z x y z T-value
Amygdala L -34 -4 -24 -32 -3 -18 4.86
L -24 -6 -24 -23 -5 -18 4.76
MPFC L 9 -10 58 22 -10 50 29 4.32
L 9 -10 52 14 -10 46 21 4.07
Inferior Frontal Gyrus L 13 -46 24 4 -44 20 9 4.51
Superior Parietal Lobule R 7 28 -60 54 24 -63 47 5.11
Fusiform Gyrus R 37 52 -60 -14 47 -57 -13 7.05
Inferior/Middle Occipital Gyrus L 18 -46 -86 -4 -44 -81 -8 9.41
L 19 -42 -76 6 -40 -73 2 6.74
R 37 48 -70 4 43 -68 2 7.78
R 44 -84 -8 40 -80 -10 6.52
Cerebellum L -44 -54 -30 -42 -49 -28 7.17
L -42 -66 -26 -40 -61 -26 5.18
L -40 -78 -20 -38 -72 -21 7.64
R 42 -52 -34 38 -47 -30 5.44
R 44 -58 -28 40 -54 -25 4.29
 
Brain areas sensitive to each type of emotional pictures. Despite the similarity revealed 
in the above conjunction analysis, a direct comparison revealed that relative to biological 
pictures, social pictures induced greater activity in bilateral MPFC (Figure 7A), which is a more 
dorsal part than the cluster revealed in the previous conjunction analysis. Dorsal MPFC has been 
implicated in elaborative processing of affective nature of stimuli (e.g., Ochsner, Knierim, et al., 
2004). Thus, the greater MPFC activity to social stimuli seems consistent with our behavioral 
results that social stimuli need elaborative processing. Socially emotional pictures also activated 
other brain regions implicated in social cognition (e.g., Adolphs, 2003; Saxe, 2006), such as the 
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posterior cingulate, bilateral temporal-parietal junction (TPJ), and the bilateral anterior temporal 
gyri (Table 2; Figure 7B-7D). In contrast, a reversed contrast (biological > social) revealed 
greater activity in the occipital gyrus and cerebellum (Figure 8). The stronger activity in the 
visual cortex for biological pictures is consistent with results in Study 1 that biological pictures 
hold visual attention more strongly than social pictures. 
ROI analyses. The whole-brain analysis described above did not reveal significant 
differences between biological and social pictures in hippocampus and parahippocampal gyrus 
activation. In ROI analyses, however, we found that social pictures produced greater activation in 
right hippocampus, F(1, 14) = 3.66, p < .08, η2 = .21, and in right parahippocampal gyrus, F(1, 
14) = 8.80, p < .05, η2 = .39, than did biological pictures (Figure 7E). There were no significant 
differences in left hippocampus and left parahippocampal gyrus (ps > .20). Thus, consistent with 
the more detailed memory for social pictures seen in Study 2, socially emotional pictures evoked 
stronger activity in memory-related regions than did biologically emotional pictures. In contrast, 
the bilateral amygdala showed similar activity between biological and social pictures (ps > .90; 
Figure 6C and 6D), which is consistent with the results from the previous conjunction analysis.
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Table 2. Brain regions showing greater activity for each type of emotional pictures.
MNI Talairach
Area H BA x y z x y z K
Social pictures > Biological pictures
Posterior Cingulate/ Precuneus L 23 0 -62 26 -1 -62 22 1659
L 31 -10 -58 28 -11 -58 24
R 31 12 -68 18 10 -67 14
MPFC L 8 -8 54 40 -9 45 44 432
L 8 -4 50 34 -5 42 39
L 9 -10 64 22 -10 56 29
Anterior Temporal Gyrus R 21 56 -4 -28 51 -3 -20 310
R 21 48 6 -40 44 7 -30
R 47 34 14 -30 31 14 -21
L 21 -58 -8 -26 -54 -7 -21 221
L 21 -54 0 -24 -51 1 -18
L 20 -48 -6 -32 -45 -4 -26
Temporal-Parietal Junction R 39 56 -56 12 51 -55 11 608
R 22 56 -40 0 51 -39 1
R 19 56 -70 10 51 -68 8
L 39 -56 -60 12 -53 -58 9 272
L 39 -40 -62 24 -38 -61 19
L 39 -44 -68 32 -42 -68 26
Biological pictures > Social pictures
Middle/Inferior Occipital Gyrus R 18 34 -88 8 30 -85 4 184
R 18 32 -90 20 28 -88 14
Cerebellum L -32 -60 -28 -30 -55 -27 203
R 32 -50 -34 29 -46 -30 216
R 28 -66 -28 25 -61 -26
R 28 -48 -22 25 -45 -19
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Figure 7. Brain regions showing greater activity for socially emotional pictures than biological pictures (Study 3). Socially 
emotional pictures induced activity in dorsal MPFC (A), posterior cingulate (circled in (B)), bilateral temporo-parietal 
junction (circled in (C) and (D)), and bilateral anterior temporal gyri (pointed to with arrows in (C) and (D)). (E) Right 
hippocampus and right parahippocampal gyrus showed greater activity in response to social pictures than to biological 
pictures. 
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Figure 8. Right occipital gyrus showed greater activity for biologically emotional 
pictures than for social ones (x = 34) in Study 3. 
Figure 9. Brain regions showing differential functional connectivity with the 
amygdala across biologically and socially emotional pictures (Study 3). (A) Inferior 
parietal lobe (circled), and occipital cortex (pointed to with arrows) showed stronger 
connectivity with left amygdala for biological pictures than for social pictures.  (B) In 
contrast, dorsal MPFC showed stronger connectivity for social pictures than for 
biological pictures. 
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Functional connectivity analyses. To address the functional connectivity with the 
amygdala, a beta series correlation analysis was applied. As a seed region, we employed a 3-mm 
sphere surrounding the peak amygdala voxel from the conjunction analysis of brain regions 
shared by biological and social emotional pictures ([-34, -4, -24] hereafter all coordinates in text 
are in the MNI space).  
This amygdala seed region had stronger functional connectivity with occipital lobe and 
inferior parietal lobe regions for biological pictures than social pictures (Table 3; Figure 9A). 
This stronger interconnection between amygdala and visual processing might facilitate 
bottom-up visual attention to biologically emotional stimuli, which in turn could contribute to the 
stronger attention effects of biologically emotional pictures revealed in Study 1.  
In contrast, the same amygdala seed region had a stronger correlation with left dorsal 
MPFC for social pictures than for biological pictures (Figure 9B). Thus, it appears that dorsal 
MPFC implements elaborative processing about socially emotional stimuli and sends its outcome 
to the amygdala during like/dislike judgments. In addition, the amygdala had stronger 
correlations with left uncus and with posterior parahippocampal gyrus for social pictures than for 
biological pictures (Table 3). These results are consistent with the results from ROI analyses and 
Study 2, suggesting that people remember socially emotional stimuli more strongly than 
biologically emotional stimuli if they have enough cognitive resources.  
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Table 3. Results from functional connectivity analyses. Areas showing greater correlation 
with left amygdala for either biological or social pictures. 
MNI Talairach
Area H BA x y z x y z T-value
Biological pictures > Social pictures
Inferior Parietal Lobule R 40 46 -54 44 41 -56 39 5.19
Middle Occipital Gyrus R 19 38 -82 12 34 -79 8 3.33
Occipital Lobe, Lingual Gyrus R 6 36 -74 8 32 -72 5 4.60
R 18 6 -80 -4 4 -76 -6 3.98
Precuneus R 7 10 -76 56 7 -77 48 4.91
Social pictures > Biological pictures
MPFC L 8 -16 46 36 -16 38 40 3.93
Posterior Parahippocampal Gyrus L 30 -26 -54 4 -25 -52 2 5.05
L 30 -20 -48 10 -20 -47 8 3.26
Uncus L 20 -34 -6 -32 -32 -4 -26 4.13
Middle Cingulate Gyrus L 24 -12 6 52 -13 -1 51 3.95
R 24 22 -4 44 19 -9 43 5.99
R 31 18 -16 38 15 -20 37 4.84
R 24 14 -8 40 11 -13 39 4.10
Precentral Gyrus L 4 -18 -18 56 -18 -23 52 6.21
L 4 -28 -20 60 -28 -25 55 5.01
R 4 14 -24 68 11 -30 63 4.79
Paracentral Lobule L 31 -6 -26 48 -7 -30 45 5.98
L 5 -12 -26 56 -13 -31 52 5.19
R 5 22 -32 54 19 -36 50 4.35
Postcentral Gyrus L 3 -26 -28 58 -26 -33 53 4.47
L 4 -34 -34 60 -33 -39 54 4.52
Inferior/Middle Temporal Gyrus L 20 -48 -12 -26 -45 -10 -21 4.17
L 21 -52 -4 -28 -49 -3 -22 3.19
 
Brain areas sensitive to emotional words. Finally, we examined brain activity induced 
by emotional words. Unlike emotional pictures, we did not find significant differences when we 
contrasted biologically emotional words to socially emotional words (and vice versa). This 
suggests that biologically and socially emotional words induce similar brain activity. To address 
this possibility, we employed two conjunction analyses.  
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Table 4. Results from conjunction analyses between emotional words and emotional 
pictures in Study 4. 
MNI Talairach
Area H BA x y z x y z T-value
Social words and Social pictures
Posterior Cingulate L 31 -4 -58 26 -5 -58 22 6.11
MPFC L 9 -2 56 16 -3 49 23 5.84
R 9 10 60 16 8 53 24 5.80
L 9 -8 60 26 -9 52 32 5.16
Temporal-Parietal junction L 19 -50 -64 18 -48 -63 14 5.02
L 39 -56 -72 18 -53 -70 13 4.63
Anterior Temporal Gyrus L 38 -38 16 -42 -36 17 -33 4.53
L 21 -50 0 -36 -47 2 -29 4.51
Biological words, Social words and Social pictures
Anterior Temporal Gyrus L 38 -46 12 -36 -43 13 -28 4.85
L 21 -52 4 -38 -49 6 -30 4.05
Precuneus/ Posterior Cingulate L 31 -8 -64 24 -9 -63 20 3.88
L 30 -4 -60 16 -5 -59 13 3.71
Temporal-Parietal junction L 39 -56 -72 22 -53 -70 17 3.66
L 39 -46 -68 20 -44 -67 15 3.18
MPFC L 8 -6 58 40 -7 49 45 3.56
Figure 10. Results from the conjunction analysis between socially emotional words 
and socially emotional pictures in Study 3.  Posterior cingulate (circled in (A)), MPFC 
(pointed to by an arrow in (A) and (B)), temporo- parietal junction (circled in (C)), and 
anterior temporal gyrus (pointed to by an arrow in (C)) showed greater activity for both 
socially emotional words and socially emotional pictures.  
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Conjunction between emotional pictures and emotional words. First, we examined 
whether emotional words produced activity in similar regions to emotional pictures in each type 
of stimuli (i.e., biological and social). A conjunction analysis between social words and social 
pictures revealed activations in dorsal MPFC, posterior cingulate, TPJ and anterior temporal 
gyrus (Table 4; Figure 10). In contrast, there were no brain regions shared by biological words 
and biological pictures even at a lower threshold level (p < .005 -uncorrected for each contrast 
entered into the conjunction analysis). Thus, it appears that socially emotional stimuli recruit 
similar brain regions irrespective of stimulus formats, whereas biologically emotional words 
produce activity in different brain regions from biological pictures.  
Conjunction analyses between socially and biologically emotional words. Next, we 
performed another conjunction analysis between biological words and social words. Although 
this conjunction analysis did not find any significant results at the same threshold level, we found 
activity in left anterior temporal lobe (-46, 12, -36: BA 38), left TPJ (-58, -64, 30: BA 39), left 
precuneus/posterior cingulate (-8, -66, 24: BA 31), and dorsal MPFC (-6, 58, 40: BA 8) at a 
lower threshold level (p < .005 -uncorrected for each contrast in the conjunction analysis). These 
clusters were similar to the clusters in which we found greater activity for socially emotional 
pictures than for biologically emotional pictures (see Table 2), suggesting that biologically 
emotional words recruit similar brain regions to socially emotional stimuli.  
To confirm this possibility, we performed another conjunction analysis, where we looked 
at the common regions among three contrasts (i.e., social pictures, social words, and biological 
words) with p < .005-uncorrected for each contrast entered in the conjunction analysis. This 
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conjunction analysis revealed activity in left anterior temporal gyrus, dorsal MPFC, left TPJ and 
posterior cingulate (Table 4). Thus, while biological words did not produce significant activity in 
any regions overlapping with biological pictures, they evoked activity in similar regions as social 
stimuli. These results suggest that once biologically emotional stimuli become abstract, they are 
processed in a similar way as socially emotional stimuli.
6
 
General Discussion 
Past studies on emotion and cognition have shown that valence and arousal modulate 
attention and memory encoding (for reviews see Dolcos & Denkova, 2008; Kensinger, 2009; 
Mather & Sutherland, in press). However, the present study reveals that subjective arousal and 
                                                 
6
 A conjunction analysis between neutral words (i.e., neutral words > nonsense words) and 
neutral pictures (i.e., neutral pictures > nonsense pictures) revealed significant activity only in 
dorsal superior frontal gyrus (-16, 36, 52; BA6) and in occipital lobe (-10, -58, 0; BA 18). Thus, 
there were no significant activations in regions involved in socially emotional stimuli, such as 
MPFC and TPJ. Although previous research reported that emotional words produced activity in 
the amygdala (Kensinger & Schacter, 2006), neither whole brain analyses nor ROI analyses 
found significantly greater activity in the amygdala to biologically and socially emotional words 
than neutral or nonsense words. Therefore, we did not examine the functional connectivity with 
the amygdala for emotional words. Because the number of emotional words in the current study 
was relatively small compared to other studies (e.g., 120 negative, 120 neutral and 120 positive 
words in Kensinger & Schacter (2006)), we might not have had enough power to detect 
responses in the amygdala.  
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valence are not enough to explain the effects of emotion; whether the image is directly relevant 
to biological motivations, such as survival or reproduction, is an additional important factor.  
Effects of Biologically and Socially Emotional Stimuli on Attention and Memory 
In Study 1, we found that biologically emotional images capture attention more than 
socially emotional images. Although we matched arousal and valence level between biologically 
and socially emotional images, socially emotional images did not impact attention differently 
than neutral images. Study 2 revealed that memory of socially emotional images is enhanced 
through elaborative processing, while memory of biologically emotional images is enhanced 
automatically: Participants’ memory of socially emotional pictures was impaired when their 
cognitive resources were deployed elsewhere, whereas the attention manipulation did not 
significantly influence memory of biologically emotional pictures. Furthermore, arousal and 
valence did not modulate the effects of biological relevance in either Studies 1 or 2. Additional 
analyses also confirmed similar results even after controlling for the effects of visual complexity 
or presence of people (S-Figure 2; see Supplementary Results for details). Thus, our behavioral 
studies suggest that biologically emotional images can induce emotional reactions more 
automatically than socially emotional stimuli, which further results in automatic influences on 
attention and memory encoding (see Figure 1). 
Past studies have revealed that perceiving an emotional stimulus modulates subsequent 
cognitive processing, enhancing processing of high-salience stimuli while reducing processing of 
low-salience stimuli (see Mather & Sutherland, 2011 for a review). The results from the current 
study further suggest that not all emotional materials can induce emotional reactions in an 
automatic/immediate way. Thus, it appears that biologically emotional stimuli can induce 
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emotional reactions automatically and have a more direct and automatic pathway to influence 
cognition, while socially emotional stimuli require elaborative processing to modulate cognitive 
processing. 
Neural Mechanisms Underlying Processing of Biologically and Socially Emotional Stimuli 
Using fMRI, Study 3 revealed both similar and different brain regions involved in 
processing biologically emotional stimuli and socially emotional stimuli. We found that the 
amygdala and MPFC showed significant activity in response to both biologically and socially 
emotional pictures. In fact, these separate activations involved overlapping voxels as shown in 
the conjunction analysis. This suggests that biologically and socially emotional images share 
some neural mechanisms. However, there were also substantial differences in the brain regions 
involved in biologically versus socially emotional pictures.  
Biologically emotional pictures recruited greater activity in the occipital gyrus than did 
socially emotional pictures. In addition, activity in the amygdala was more positively correlated 
with activity in the occipital gyrus during viewing of biologically emotional pictures than during 
viewing of social pictures. This greater visual cortex activation is consistent with the enhanced 
attention effects of biologically emotional pictures revealed in Study 1, suggesting that the 
amygdala’s arousal response is more related to the visual features of the biologically emotional 
pictures than to the visual aspects of the socially emotional pictures.  
In contrast, socially emotional pictures induced greater activity in dorsal MPFC than did 
biologically emotional pictures. Furthermore, the amygdala was more positively correlated with 
dorsal MPFC for socially emotional images than for biological images. The dorsal MPFC has 
been associated with elaborative processing of emotional aspects of stimuli (Cunningham, et al., 
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2003; Ochsner, Knierim, et al., 2004) and with performing tasks that require deep processing of 
affective nature of stimuli (e.g., Johnson, et al., 2006; J. P. Mitchell, Banaji, & Macrae, 2005; 
Norris, et al., 2004; Ochsner, Knierim, et al., 2004), such as emotion regulation (Ochsner, Ray, et 
al., 2004; Phan, et al., 2005), moral judgments (Moll, de Oliveira-Souza, Eslinger, et al., 2002), 
and theory-of-mind task (Gallagher, et al., 2000). In addition, activity in dorsal MPFC has been 
associated with successful memory encoding of socially emotional stimuli (Harvey, Fossati, & 
Lepage, 2007). Together with these previous findings, our findings suggest that socially 
emotional pictures require more elaborative processing implemented by dorsal MPFC to 
modulate cognitive processing and to elicit the activity in the amygdala than do biologically 
emotional pictures. 
Additional brain regions associated with socially emotional stimuli. In addition to 
dorsal MPFC, socially emotional pictures activated brain regions implicated in social cognition 
(Adolphs, 2003; Saxe, 2006), such as TPJ, anterior temporal lobe, and posterior 
cingulate/precuneus. Although these areas did not produce significant results in the functional 
connectivity analysis, they may also play important roles in processing of socially emotional 
pictures.  
For instance, the anterior temporal lobe has been implicated in conceptual processing of 
social stimuli; it activates during semantic judgments about social stimuli (J. P. Mitchell, 
Heatherton, & Macrae, 2002; Zahn, et al., 2007; Zahn, et al., 2009), retrieval of other people’s 
names (Tsukiura, Mochizuki-Kawai, & Fujii, 2006), and learning of facts about other people 
(e.g., age, occupation; Simmons, Reddish, Bellgowan, & Martin, 2010).   
In contrast, posterior cingulate and precuneus have been implicated in self-referential 
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processing (Johnson, et al., 2006), perspective taking (Ruby & Decety, 2001), episodic 
recollection (Wagner, Shannon, Kahn, & Buckner, 2005), and simulation of others’ behaviors 
(Calvo-Merino, Glaser, Grezes, Passingham, & Haggard, 2005). Although a precise role of this 
area is still not fully understood, all of these tasks involve detailed mental representations. Thus, 
this area may help implement internally generated representations (Cavanna & Trimble, 2006).  
Finally, TPJ has been implicated in orienting attention to relevant stimuli that are outside 
the focus of attention (Corbetta, Kincade, & Shulman, 2002; J. P. Mitchell, 2008). For instance, 
TPJ activity was associated with social tasks that require people to direct their attention from 
what they think to what other people think, such as theory-of-mind task (Saxe & Kanwisher, 
2003; Young, Cushman, Hauser, & Saxe, 2007). 
These previous findings provide clues about the ensemble of cognitive processes needed 
for socially emotional stimuli: a) conceptual processing and semantic interpretation of presented 
stimuli -- implemented by the anterior temporal lobe, b) mental imagery about the represented 
situations to simulate others’ feelings or thoughts -- implemented by posterior 
cingulate/precuneus, and c) attention reoriented from one’s own feelings and thoughts to others’ 
thoughts or feelings -- implemented by the TPJ. Further research is needed to address how the 
dorsal MPFC and the amygdala interact with these brain regions during processing of socially 
emotional materials. 
Underlying Mechanisms of Automatic Effects of Biologically Emotional Stimuli  
Next, we turn to the question of why biologically emotional pictures modulate cognitive 
processing more automatically than do socially emotional pictures.  
Evolutionary relevance. One possibility is that biologically emotional pictures involve 
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evolutionary threats that have been recurrent problems in human ancestral environments, which 
might have resulted in the preferential processing of those stimuli. In fact, some of the 
biologically emotional stimuli employed in the current study have been considered to be 
evolutionarily threatening (e.g., snake, spider; Öhman & Mineka, 2001) and revealed to be 
processed automatically (Öhman, 2002; Öhman, Flykt, et al., 2001), which is consistent with the 
findings about biologically emotional stimuli in the current study.  
In Study 1, however, participants detected the dot-probe significantly slower after 
biological pictures than after social pictures, regardless of whether they were evolutionary threats 
or not (see Supplementary Methods and Results for details). Likewise, in Study 2, dividing 
attention did not have significant effects on memory for biologically emotional images not 
depicting an evolutionary threat. Furthermore, both in Studies 1 and 2, angry faces (i.e., 
evolutionarily threatening, but social stimuli) showed similar patterns to other socially emotional 
stimuli. Consistent with these results from post-hoc analyses, previous research which compared 
evolutionary threats (e.g., snakes) with non-evolutionary threats (e.g., guns) found that the two 
types of threats had similar effects on attention (Blanchette, 2006; Brosch & Sharma, 2005; 
Carlson, et al., 2009; Fox, et al., 2007) and aversive conditioning (Hugdahl & Johnsen, 1989). 
Taken together, it seems unlikely that the automatic effects we observed with biologically 
emotional stimuli are attributable to the effects of evolutionary threats. 
Saliency/ambiguity of physical manifestations. Instead, we argue that the differences in 
processing biological and social emotional stimuli are due to whether the physical manifestations 
of a situation are salient or ambiguous. Biologically emotional pictures depict situations highly 
related to survival or reproduction. Therefore, they would imply clear and direct physical 
47 
 
 
outcomes, such as death, injuries, satiety, and sexual experiences, irrespective of contexts. This 
clear and context-independent nature of biologically emotional stimuli might allow people to 
extract the affective meanings of the stimuli without elaborative processing, which results in the 
automatic influences on cognitive processing. In contrast, the same social stimulus could have 
different meanings and outcomes depending on contexts. Thus, the meanings and the outcomes 
are less obvious in socially emotional stimuli, which could explain the absence of their automatic 
influences on cognitive processing.  
In fact, the results from Study 3 suggest that the saliency of physical manifestations plays a 
more important role than whether stimuli are conceptually relevant with survival/reproduction or 
social life. In Study 3, we found little overlap between biological pictures and words, and 
biological words produced activity in similar regions as did socially emotional stimuli. Although 
biological words are conceptually related to survival or reproduction, the physical manifestations 
are less obvious from the visual features of biological words than from those of biological 
pictures. As a consequence, biological words might require more elaborative processing than 
biological pictures to elicit an affective reaction, which might have resulted in similar brain 
activation patterns to socially emotional stimuli.  
However, past studies employing taboo words revealed that highly arousing biological 
words can have automatic influences on attention (e.g., Anderson, 2005; MacKay, et al., 2004; 
Mathewson, et al., 2008). Since these results were consistent with the findings about biologically 
emotional images in the current study, they suggest that biological relevance can have a 
significant impact even when the saliency of physical manifestations is low. Further research 
should manipulate both the biological/social relevance and the saliency of the physical outcomes 
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to clarify the role of each factor in emotional processing. 
In addition, there might be other differences between biological and social emotional 
stimuli that are more responsible for the current results than the biological/social relevance or the 
saliency of the physical outcome. In the current study, we controlled the effects of the two 
dimensions (i.e., arousal and valence) that have been predominantly examined in the past 
literature on emotion and cognition. Similar results were also obtained after controlling the 
effects of visual complexity, the presence of people, and the evolutionary threats. Furthermore, in 
Study 3, we controlled luminance and frequency. However, biologically and socially emotional 
stimuli might differ in other ways, such as semantic relatedness (Talmi, et al., 2007), relevance to 
approach/avoidance behaviors (Wentura, Rothermund, & Bak, 2000), or how strongly the 
stimulus induces certain actions/behaviors (Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989). Future research 
should address the effects of biological/social relevance while considering these other factors to 
clarify which dimension of emotional stimuli is more crucial.  
Questions for Future Research 
Several other questions also remain for further work. First, past research found that highly 
arousing stimuli are attended to (Anderson, 2005; Knight, et al., 2007) and memorized 
(Kensinger & Corkin, 2004) more automatically than low arousing stimuli. These observations 
are similar to the patterns we found in biologically emotional pictures, suggesting the possibility 
that some of the previous findings of arousal effects might be due to biological relevance, instead 
of arousal per se. In fact, in our two pilot rating studies and S-Study 1, relevance to 
survival/reproduction was positively correlated with arousal ratings even after controlling for the 
effects of the social relevance (see S-Table 7). Future research should manipulate both arousal 
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level and motivational relevance, to clarify the effects of motivational relevance, the effects of 
arousal and interactions between them. 
Second, the current article focused on two kinds of emotional stimuli: those highly 
relevant to survival/reproduction and low in relation to social adaptation and those highly 
relevant to social adaptation but low in relation to survival/reproduction. Although this 
categorical approach allowed us to demonstrate the effects of the biological/social relevance, in 
real life, emotional stimuli sometimes relate to both survival/reproduction and social adaptation. 
For example, in addition to their survival value, certain foods (such as a birthday cake) might 
evoke emotion via their social meanings. Similarly, some social stimuli (e.g., one’s family) might 
have significance not only in social adaptation but also in reproduction (e.g., raising their 
offspring). In addition, we did not include stimuli that are related to participants’ own survival 
(e.g., real foods) or social life (e.g., their friends); these stimuli might influence cognitive 
processing differently from stimuli that depict biologically/socially emotional objects but are not 
actually relevant with participants’ own survival or social life (e.g., pictures depicting foods). 
Further research employing more fine-grained categorizations of emotional stimuli is needed to 
elucidate how the biological and social relevance modulate emotional processing. 
A third question concerns whether biological and social relevance influence processing of 
neutral materials. In fact, previous studies demonstrated that neutral words rated for relevance to 
a grasslands survival scenario were remembered better than words encoded under other deep 
processing conditions (e.g., Nairne, Pandeirada, Gregory, & Van Arsdall, 2009; Nairne, 
Pandeirada, & Thompson, 2008; Weinstein, Bugg, & Roediger, 2008), suggesting that even the 
processing of neutral stimuli may benefit from survival relevance.  
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But it is difficult to disentangle the effects of biological relevance and arousal. For instance, 
rating neutral words for their relevance to a survival scenario was done in the context of higher 
arousal than in the control condition (Soderstrom & McCabe, 2011). In the current research, 
biological relevance was positively correlated with arousal in the two pilot studies and S-Study 1, 
even after controlling the effects of social relevance (see S-Table 7). Furthermore, when people 
had strong biological needs (e.g., thirst), neutral stimuli that satisfied the biological need (e.g., 
water) were evaluated positively (not as neutral stimuli; Ferguson & Bargh, 2004). These results 
suggest that biological relevance increases emotionality, and that it is hard to define neutral but 
biologically relevant stimuli. In contrast, given that the social relevance had weaker correlations 
with arousal than biological relevance (S-Table 7), there should be neutral stimuli relevant to 
social life (e.g., Norris, et al., 2004). These social but neutral stimuli might induce similar 
elaborative processing as socially emotional stimuli in order for people to interpret their meaning. 
Further research should address whether the social relevance has similar effects for emotional 
and neutral stimuli.  
Another question concerns processing of angry faces. While angry faces have been 
associated with automatic attention (e.g., Öhman, Lundqvist, & Esteves, 2001), the reaction 
times to detect the dot-probe were not different across angry faces, other social stimuli and 
neutral stimuli in Study 1 (see Supplementary Results for details). Similarly, in Study 2, angry 
faces were remembered better than neutral pictures in the full-attention condition, but the 
enhancement disappeared in the divided-attention condition. These results were consistent with 
recent neuroimaging findings that processing emotional faces requires cognitive resources (e.g., 
Pessoa, McKenna, Gutierrez, & Ungerleider, 2002; Pessoa, Padmala, & Morland, 2005). 
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One of the main reasons researchers have assumed that emotional faces are processed 
automatically is the substantial behavioral evidence showing faster detection of emotional faces 
than neutral faces (Calvo & Nummenmaa, 2008; Frischen, Eastwood, & Smilek, 2008; Hansen 
& Hansen, 1988; Horstmann, 2007; Larson, Aronoff, & Stearns, 2007; Lipp, 2006; LoBue & 
DeLoache, 2010; Mather & Knight, 2006). However, the faster detection of emotional faces can 
be at least partially accounted for by differences in perceptual salience among the facial features 
associated with different emotions (Calvo & Nummenmaa, 2008). Thus, previous findings of 
faster detection of emotional faces may not reflect automatic attention to emotional stimuli. 
Indeed, recent research revealed that although angry faces activated the amygdala in a visual 
search task, the amygdala showed similar activity even for neutral but perceptually salient faces 
(Santos, Mier, Kirsch, & Meyer-Lindenberg, 2011). Our findings further suggest that, once 
detected, emotional faces do not automatically elicit emotional responses that enhance attention 
or later memory – such responses instead require cognitive resources. 
Several methodological questions remain for future studies. For example, the current study 
used a dot-probe task combined with a riddle-solving task to investigate the effects of biological 
and social emotional materials on attention. Although the riddle task helped us to increase 
participants’ engagements in the task, this is not a typical way to examine attention. In addition, 
we did not counterbalance target items and lures in the recognition tests, which might have 
produced bias effects in our memory results. Furthermore, the number of trials in Studies 1 and 3 
was relatively low to address the effects of arousal and valence separately for each stimulus type 
category (social vs. biological). Further research addressing these issues is needed. 
Conclusions 
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The present study provided evidence that emotional stimuli related to survival or 
reproduction modulate cognitive processing, such as memory encoding and attention, more 
automatically than those related to social life. We also found that these two kinds of emotional 
materials both induced activity in the amygdala, which is a key region in emotion processing 
(Dolan, 2002; Phelps, 2006). Despite this similarity, there were substantial differences in the 
brain regions involved in biologically and socially emotional materials. Socially emotional 
stimuli recruited dorsal MPFC, a region involved in elaborative processing of emotional stimuli, 
and yielded functional connectivity between amygdala and dorsal MPFC. In contrast, 
biologically emotional stimuli induced stronger activity in visual cortex and greater functional 
connectivity between amygdala and visual cortex. Such connectivity should facilitate bottom-up, 
automatic visual attention to biologically emotional stimuli. Since we controlled arousal and 
valence level across the socially and biologically emotional materials, our results are unlikely to 
be attributed to either valence or arousal. Taken together, our results suggest that the emotional 
nature of stimuli related to survival or reproduction is processed more automatically than the 
emotional nature of stimuli related to social life, and that subjective valence and arousal are not 
sufficient to explain automatic effects of emotion on cognitive processing.     
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